Published on the web of
Prof. Martin van Creveld
http://www.martin-van-creveld.com/2017/04/
6 April 2017
Air
Forces
Balance of Power in the Middle East
By: Karsten Riise
Air
forces are of colossal importance in the Balance of Power between states.
Without air superiority, a state is open for huge devastation from potential
adversaries. To get a clearer picture of the Balance of Power in the Middle
East, I therefore decided to focus on the balance of assets for air superiority
in the Wider Middle East - see figure 1:
Figure 1
Methodology
My
methodology in figure 1 is straight forward: Only high-end fighter (or
multirole) aircraft in service are relevant for the contestation of air space.
It is assumed high-end fighters in service have received all technical upgrades
for high-end status. Light or older fighter aircraft are shown, but may
quickly be eliminated. To keep the methodology robust, I focus on the
sheer number of high-end air superiority fighters. Only easily available, open
sources have been used.
Readiness
is a significant quantifiable factor which has not been easily available. If a
modern air force has a normal readiness of for example 70%, it may well be,
that Iran, due to lack of spare parts, lack of instruments, lack of trained
pilots and technicians, may have a readiness of only 35%. If that is the case,
the effective force of Iran would be only half of what her number of 44
high-end units indicates, bringing Iran's total force down to 22 comparable
"units of force-level".
The
"qualitative factors" like pilot-training, support-structures,
leadership, configuration of bases, communication, support from other assets
(ground-sensors, AWACS, satellites) etc. can be decisive. Also lethality and
availability of modern munitions (e.g. air-to-air missiles) go into this. A
"quality-factor" is difficult to measure, but it is still possible to
say something in general about "quality" level. If USA=100 in
"quality-factor", it is generally accepted that Israel's "quality-factor"
is probably quite above 100, that the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries
are probably a bit below 100, and that Iran is very much lower due to lack of
training, and other modern assets. In this analysis, I will not measure
"quality-factors", just point to them.
Overview
Figure
1 brings up four issues for my discussion: First, Iran's obvious lack of air
power against all of her many competitors. Second, the enormous increase in GCC
air power, not least in Saudi Arabia. Third, the balance of power in relation
to Israel. Fourth, the issue of nuclear weapons.
Iran
- vacuum of air-power
Iran
has only got 44 high-end aircraft to disperse, and they may not all be upgraded
to deserve "high-end" status. Due to lack of training, spare parts
etc. it may well be that Iran's readiness factor is only half of her
neighboring countries, which means that her 44 units may only count as a
"force-level" of 22. These 22 units of "force-level" have
to be split up in (minimum) 3-6 sectors to defend a vast territory of 1,6
million km2, leaving only a meager 3-7 units of modern "force-level"
per defense sector. It is obvious, that Iran does not possess any of the air
assets necessary to protect her air space, not even against the air force of
her smallest neighbors. Deficits in other "qualitative" combat
factors like pilot-training only reinforce this conclusion. A few S-300
anti-air missiles may serve as a "trip-wire" for point-defense, but
without a comprehensive, layered integrated air defense system, a few S-300 do
not change the overall picture of a nearly undefended air space. The regional
stability risk, therefore, seems not to be that Iran becomes "too
strong", but rather, that Iran in terms of air defense is a power-vacuum,
which could invite intrusion from any of her numerous competitors. Iran does
possess a substantial number of surface-to-surface missiles of considerable
range, which are often cited (especially by USA sources) as a
"threat". But you cannot win a war with surface-to-surface missiles
alone, and all of Iran's competitors have got effective Patriot missile
defenses. In view of Iran's lack of air power, Iran's surface-to-surface
missiles are a stand-alone capability. Iran's missiles must merely be seen as
a deterrent, in other words a defensive capability,
which stabilizes the region, because Iran's missiles discourage
attack on Iran. Iran also possesses a capability of armed speed-boats,
land-to-sea missiles etc. which can obstruct the oil traffic in the Persian Gulf.
This marine capability, like Iran's conventionally armed land-to-land missiles,
must also in the overall context be seen as a deterrent, discouraging attack on
Iran, but not a capability which gives Iran encouragement for a very
adventurous strategy. As it will appear below in figure 2 and 3, Iran is not
investing an overly great portion of her economy in military.
Is
this "good" or "bad"? Well, anyone reserving a
"right" to attack Iran, may think it is "good". Given
the troubling experiences in the region of turning a functioning country into
havoc and chaos, it may arguably also be "bad".
GCC
- enormous increase in air-power
All
the GCC countries relative to their size possess very large quantities of
high-end air assets. The GCC total is 409 aircraft, and with 349 units more on
order, this group is on way to an inventory of 758 units. In comparison, France
and Britain have a total of 369 high-end units, according to the same sources.
Even the smaller GCC-states have by a wide margin plenty of assets against
Iran. Saudi Arabia alone has got 222 units, and 156 more on order, for a total
of 378 units. An additional order of 72 Eurofighters is under consideration,
which could bring Saudi Arabia up to 450 units. According to
GlobalSecurity.org, Saudi Arabia has also asked for 100 units of F-35
"stealth" fighters. If Saudi Arabia is denied F-35 from the USA, she
may instead choose to buy J-31 "stealth" fighters from China. That
might bring the Royal Saudi Air Force up to 550 units. Saudi Arabia also
possesses 13 units of E3-sentry AWACS. In comparison, NATO for patrolling all
its Eastern flank from Norway to Turkey (4,000+ km) has got about 16 similar
units.
The
question comes up, why Saudi Arabia invests in air superiority assets on such a
large scale. Air force may be the most expensive part of Saudi Arabian military
spending, and Saudi Arabia's military spending of 13.7% of GDP in 2015 is the
third the highest in the world after Oman (and South Sudan, not shown) - see
figure 2:
Figure 2
Oil
prices have been high for many of the preceding years. Surplus money may tempt
military spending. On the other hand, Saudi Arabia's high air force investments
are felt now that oil incomes have been depressed the last few years, and Saudi
Arabia also wants to invest huge sums of money in diversifying her economy to
achieve a broader economic footing to prepare for her "post-oil" era
in due time.
Intentions
are never known for sure, and may even change. I will go through a range
of seven theoretical types of thinkable intentions. First, air forces have
prestige. But the "bling" factor can hardly explain investment on
this scale. Second, "defense against Iran" can be ruled out as a
reason, because the Iranian air force is so small, ref above. Third, the Saudi
Arabian and GCC assets are so numerous, that an offensive strategy (for example
against Iran) may be a possibility, especially if the Patriot systems (which
all the GCC countries have) are effective to defend against possible
retaliatory missile strikes. Fourth, protection of Saudi Arabia against
internal revolts, might theoretically be thought of, but the Saudi Arabian air
force seems bigger than needed for that. Fifth, Saudi Arabia might seek the
role of a great regional power. For the general role as a regional power, Saudi
Arabia will need a strong navy to complement her air force in power-projection.
And according to the open sources used here, Saudi Arabia actually has got an
ambitious navy program with 7 frigates, 4 corvettes, and contemplates buying
2-3 destroyers, including the powerful American Arleigh Burke class, plus the
advanced Freedom class littoral combat ship. Submarines are missing. For power
projection, Saudi Arabia also has 2 tanker aircraft, 3 more tankers on order,
plus a number of heavy transport aircraft. Saudi Arabia also has a satellite
program, but her missile force seems not built out. Sixth, Saudi Arabia might
not rule out, that a conflict with Israel could erupt one day, willingly or
unwillingly, perhaps just due to misunderstandings. Here, however, Israel is in
possession of the "great peacekeeper" in form of nuclear devices.
Seventh, we may look at the timing of Saudi Arabia's increase in military
spending - see figure 3:
Figure 3
The
acceleration in Saudi Arabian military spending started 2004/2005, after the
USA war for "regime change" in Iraq. It might be thinkable, that
Saudi Arabia wants to have an "insurance policy", that such an
American action should never be turned against Saudi Arabia. To make this
effective, Saudi Arabia would need to add aircraft from non-US suppliers, and
(better) to have themselves the kind of "devices" which Israel has in
possession. All this is of course theoretical, because the surge in Saudi
Arabian military spending since 2004/2005 also to some degree
coincides with a higher general level of oil prices.
Israel
- the balance
Iran's
air force is not a threat to Israel in any foreseeable future. Even Iran's
missiles are probably not a major threat, due to Israel's Patriot, which are
layered with other missile defense systems. From figure 1, it appears that
Israel in relatively few years will have 366 fighter aircraft against 1,046
fighters (or more) from the GCC-countries, Egypt and Jordan. These countries
are not Israel's enemies, and Israel has good practical relations with all of
them. However, a coming numerical disadvantage of 3:1 is something to think
about, even taking into account Israeli historical superiority in
training, her satellite assets etc..
Nuclear
weapons
As
demonstrated above, in the conventional regional balance of power, Israel is
easily outnumbered. But it isn't the number of aircraft or the high
standards of Israeli pilots, which keep Israel free from major conflicts.
Israel
being free from major conflict simply hinges on Israel's possession of nuclear
weapons. This will also apply, if more sides of a potential conflict
possess them. The nuclear situation goes into all regional political
calculations about establishing working relationships with Israel or not, and
if not, then "how-to-not", that is, keeping possible actions on a
level short-of-(major)-war. Nuclear weapons "overlay" the
conventional balance of power.
A
country with nuclear weapons has less need to upkeep a conventional balance of
forces. But this does not make conventional weapons dispensable, because
nuclear weapons are politically ineffective, if a country does not have a
minimum of conventional force to effectively handle intermediate steps of
escalation between perfect peace and total armageddon. Air policing in peace
time is an illustration - if a country does not have sufficient conventional
means to expel intruding aircraft, it might experience significant blackmail
and political degradation, even if in possession of nuclear weapons. This
is something to think about in the (sometimes rather narrow) discussion of Iran
and possible nuclear weapons, exactly in view of Iran's lack of up-to-date
conventional power (ref. figure 1 above). This intricate logic also
applies, when both or even quite many sides of different potential conflicts
might one day have nuclear weapons. As an example, the North Korean military
may be overgrown in its conventional size, but still, possession of nuclear
weapons would not make it possible for North Korea to dispense with a
substantial minimum of conventional force. This will also apply, if nuclear
weapons should spread in the often quite tense and potentially
multidimensionally conflictual region of the Wider Middle East.
Notably,
nuclear weapons do not prevent "low-level" conflicts from erupting -
or persisting.
Karsten
Riise
Partner
& Editor
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